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grant agreement No 822781.With public debt amounting to 132.1% of GDP and negative productivity growth 
over the last twenty years, Italy appears to be stuck in a high-debt and low-growth trap. 
We focus on the causes of Italy's two main economic plights and discuss how they are 
intimately related: a slow growth limits the budgetary margins and casts doubts on 
public debt sustainability; the reduced fiscal space and the tight fiscal rules in turn 
weighs on growth and public investment. 
In the first part, we discuss the roots of the explosion of Italian public debt, the 
country's consolidation attempts in the 1990s and early 2000s and finally, the effects of 
the Great Recession and fiscal austerity. In the second part, we identify the structural 
weaknesses of the Italian economy. We notably emphasize the specialization bias 
towards low tech sectors, the “nanism” of Italian firms, the misallocation of talents and 
resources, the North-South divide and its related labor market consequences. We 
conclude with some policy recommendations for a revival of growth in Italy. 
Our first proposal calls for industrial policies which foster knowledge accumulation 
and firm learning. The second proposal envisages a new European fiscal golden rule 
which would remove specific public investments from the computation of structural 
primary balance. Our third proposal is instead related to labor market regulation, and 
advocates for the introduction of a minimum wage on the one hand, and the facilitation 
of retraining policies on the other hand. Our fourth proposal highlights the need to 
complete the banking union and to solve the issue of non-performing loans in order to 
improve the robustness of the Italian banking sector. Lastly, we conclude that Italy's fate 
is inextricably related to Europe's and that Italy needs more rather than less Europe to 
escape its high-debt and low-growth trap. 
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2   |   OFCE  policy briefWith a negative productivity growth over the last twenty years, Italy brings 
up the rear of growth in the European Union. In addition, Italy's public sector ranks as 
one of the most indebted in the world, with a debt amounting to 132.1% of GDP in 
2018. The country which, after the second world war, became the symbol of the 
“economic miracle”—a period of unprecedented economic and employment growth, 
high productivity and real income increases—does not seem to find the way out of its 
doldrums. Today, the world tenth economic power conveys the image of a clay-footed 
colossus, prisoner of a low growth trap, a high debt burden and structural weaknesses 
that the Great Recession of 2008 have exacerbated further. In this Policy brief, we 
focus on these two main plights of Italy: high public debt burden on the one hand, 
sluggish GDP and productivity growth on the other hand. Both issues are intimately 
intertwined: the absence of growth increases the debt burden; the reduced fiscal space 
in turn weights on growth and public investment, depriving the economy of one of 
its engines.
Our first goal is to retrace the history of the Italian public debt problem. We identify 
the origins of Italy's sizeable government debt, and we shed some light on the drivers 
affecting its evolution. We show that this evolution can be decomposed into four 
distinct phases. In the last phase, we document how a badly-timed fiscal consolidation 
policies contributed to both limiting GDP growth and raising public debt. Yet, the 
origins of the Italian economic decline are much more ancient. In the second part, we 
review some of the structural weaknesses of the Italian economy, notably a specializa-
tion bias towards low tech sectors, the “nanism” of Italian firms, the misallocation of 
talents and resources, the North-South divide and its related labor market issues.
We conclude the Policy brief with four policy recommendations which could help 
reigniting economic growth in Italy. We advocate a revival of industrial policies that 
should nurture knowledge accumulation and firm learning, productivity growth being 
a main issue. Our suggestions also include a technical proposal—creating a new Euro-
pean fiscal golden rule which would remove specific public investments from the 
computation of structural primary balance—as well as proposals to tackle labor market 
issues, with the introduction of a minimum wage and the facilitation of retraining poli-
cies. We also advocate the need to complete the banking union and to solve the issue 
of non-performing loans in order to improve the robustness of the Italian banking 
sector. Last, we consider that Italy's fate is inextricably related to Europe's and that Italy 
needs more rather than less Europe. Therefore, the country must play its part to the full 
in order to help reshaping Europe.
At the roots of the explosion of public debt in Italy 
Discussions about Italy's public debt issue, and its potential disruptive conse-
quences for the stability of the European Union, have for a long time occupied a 
central place in political and economic arenas. Figure 1 plots the historical time-series 
of the government debt-to-GDP ratio in Italy starting in the 1960s. We clearly identify 
four distinct phases in the history of Italian public debt. A first phase, between the early 
1960s and 1980, was characterized by a positive but moderate growth of debt. A 
second phase, unfolding through the 1980s and until 1992, saw the explosion of 
public debt, from 54% of GDP in 1980 to roughly 117% in 1994. The third phase, 
which began with the budget law of the Amato's government in 1992, coincides with 
a significant fiscal consolidation effort, and the public debt to GDP ratio eventually 
OFCE  policy brief   |   3
Rossi, S. (2007). La politica economica 
italiana, 1968-2007, GLF Editori     
Laterza.
1.
The latter stemmed from two factors. 
First, the practice of monetary fi-
nancing of debt began to decrease in  
the 1980s, following the so-called 
“divorce” between the Bank of Italy 
and the Ministry of Treasury in 1981. 
Second, in the framework of the Eu-
ropean Monetary System (EMS), 
fixed exchange rates were imple-
mented. These policy choices aimed 
at disinflating the Italian economy 
and at pushing forward the European 
economic integration process. Yet 
they also resulted in a significant and 
prolonged increase in the real inter-
est rate on public debt in Italy.  
2.
The structural budget balance is in-
deed the primary balance, corrected 
for the effect of the business cycle on 
tax revenues and government ex-
penditures. It thus provides a concise 
measure of fiscal consolidation (or its 
lack thereof).decreasing below 100% in 2007. The stabilization effort was however interrupted by 
the Great Recession and by its effects on public finances in the European Union. In the 
fourth phase, from 2008 on, the public debt-to-GDP ratio consequently increased, 
reaching the current level of 132.1% in 2018. 
Figure 2 shows how the different drivers of public debt and GDP (government 
primary deficit, interest expenditure as a fraction of nominal GDP, real GDP growth 
and inflation) contributed to the growth of the public debt-to-GDP ratio. The chart 
indicates that the seeds of the rapid growth of the Italian government debt observed 
during the 1980s must first be found in the high and persistent primary deficits that 
were accumulated by Italian governments since the mid-1970s, and that contributed 
significantly to debt growth in spite of a high real GDP growth, positive inflation and 
low interest rates favored by the monetary financing of public debt. As it has been 
noted elsewhere (see e.g. Rossi, 2007 among others), this fiscal profligacy stemmed 
from the inability of Italian governments to finance the increase in welfare state related 
government expenditures with a stable increase in tax revenues. The fragile fiscal 
stance of the 1970s and 1980s alone would however not solely explain the explosion 
in public debt. A second, and equally important contribution, came from the robust 
rise in interest payments starting from the 1980s.1   
The 1992 budget law by the Amato government marked a turning point in the 
history of Italian fiscal policy, and the beginning of a fiscal consolidation phase that 
lasted for more than a decade. Table 1 compares the structural primary balances2 of 
governments in the Euro 12 from 1995 to 2018. On average, Italian governments 
persistently scored sizeable structural primary surpluses during the entire period 
considered. In addition, these surpluses were always much higher than the average in 
the Euro 12.
The main result of this fiscal consolidation was the reduction of the public debt-to-
GDP ratio from a 117% peak (reached in 1997) to a value below 100% in 2007 (cf. 
Figure 1). Nevertheless, given the high level of outstanding debt at the beginning of 
the 1990s, such a reduction would have been impossible without the significant 
decrease in real interest rates on debt, which was observed starting from 1993 (see 
Figure 1. Evolution of the Government Debt to GDP ratio
 In % of GDP
Source: AMECO.
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4   |   OFCE  policy briefFigure 2). This steady trend was the outcome of the interest rates convergence trig-
gered by the process that ultimately led to the introduction of the euro, and it is 
undoubtedly one of the greatest benefits that Italy has gained from the introduction of 
the common currency. 
Figure 2. The drivers of Italian public debt growth
Contributions to the growth of the public debt/GDP ratio
Sources: AMECO, OECD, authors' calculations.
Table 1. Average net lending (+) or net borrowing (-) excluding interests of general 
government adjusted for the cyclical component
In % of GDP
1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 2015-2018
Austria 0.230 1.147 -0.266 0.306 1.523
Belgium 5.783 5.458 1.663 0.014 1.193
Finland 3.196 5.610 2.500 -0.324 0.633
France 0.694 -0.226 -1.664 -2.150 -0.880
Germany -0.533 0.026 0.984 1.494 2.124
Greece 2.454 -0.898 -7.976 -2.200 4.001
Ireland 4.849 0.936 -3.853 -3.931 -1.498
Italy 5.168 2.006 0.321 2.081 1.987
Luxembourg 4.364 2.375 1.453 1.824 1.618
Netherlands 2.051 0.884 0.145 -1.186 1.648
Portugal 0.242 -2.124 -3.226 -1.955 1.972
Spain 1.245 1.830 -2.489 -4.104 -0.739
Euro 12 2.479 1.419 -1.034 -0.844 1.132
Note: Adjustments based on trend GDP.   
Source  AMECO database, authors' calculations.
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Another important item that we do 
not display here is the compensation 
of employees, which remained stable 
in relationship to GDP on the entire 
1995-2017 period. 
Sampognaro R., (2018). “Les effets 
de la politique budgétaire depuis 
2008 dans six économies avancées.” 
Revue de l'OFCE. 155(1): 269–302.The fiscal consolidation efforts in the 1990s and the early 2000s were completely 
wiped out by the 2008 Great Recession and the consequent sovereign debt crisis in 
Europe. The Italian public debt-to-GDP ratio rose sharply in few years from roughly 
100% in 2007 to 131% in 2014, and it has been fluctuating around that value since 
then. It is worth noticing that: (i) this upsurge of 31 percentage points in public debt 
occurred in half of the time that it took to reduce the same ratio by 20 percentage 
points (see supra); (ii) the increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio occurred despite the signif-
icant structural primary fiscal surpluses accumulated by the Italian governments (see 
the last two columns of Table 1). 
The main causes of this debt resurgence were the rise in real interest rate on debt as 
a consequence of the sovereign debt crisis on the 2008-2012 period (Figure 2), and 
the low GDP growth rates. Indeed, negative real GDP growth gave a positive contribu-
tion to debt growth during that period. 
In a period of structural primary surpluses, low inflation and with central bank 
interest rates already close to the zero lower bound, the only way to reduce Italian 
public debt is an increase in real GDP growth. Unfortunately, as Figure 2 shows, real 
GDP growth in Italy has been weak since the 2000s and even turned negative in 2008-
2009 and 2012-13, positively contributing to the growth of debt. In addition, when 
analyzing the contributions of aggregate demand components to real GDP growth 
since 1996, Antonin et al., 2019 show that the positive contributions, both before and 
after the strains of the Great Recession, mainly came from domestic components like 
private consumption and investment. In contrast, the positive contribution of exports 
was almost always compensated by the negative contribution of imports. Hence, Italy 
was unable to grow via external demand in the period considered, despite the market 
integration opportunities offered by the introduction of the euro in 2000. This reveals a 
structural weakness of the Italian productive system, which has lost international market 
shares since the Great Recession of 2008 (a theme we discuss in more detail infra).
A second negative contribution came from government consumption, which signif-
icantly fell in relation to GDP since 2009 (see Figure 4). This is clearly the outcome of a 
combination between the already high debt-to-GDP ratio and the austerity efforts 
imposed by fiscal rules in the European Union. However, fiscal austerity did not have an 
impact solely on government consumption. Government investment also plummeted 
more than GDP since 2009 (see again Figure 3). Interestingly, Figure 4 shows also how 
that reduction was partly explained by the need to have more room to finance the 
increase in social benefits expenditure from 2008 on.3 Hence, in a regime of heavy 
constraints imposed on fiscal policy, Italian governments chose to substitute invest-
ment for revenue subsidies, in this way hampering the growth potential of the country. 
At the same time, such a “dangerous” choice was somewhat imposed both by the 
strains of the Great Recession (the increase in social benefits since 2008 is mostly due 
to the increase in unemployment benefits) and by the prolonged stagnant productivity 
and income growth in Italy (see also infra). Finally, a further negative stimulus to aggre-
gate demand came from the tax burden, that significantly increased over GDP 
between 2005 and 2013. 
Overall, fiscal austerity aggravated the fall in aggregate private demand triggered 
by the Great Recession, by implying a reduction in government consumption and 
investment and a significant increase in the fiscal pressure in the 2009-2013 period. 
Sampognaro (2018) estimates that Italian consolidation efforts made from 2008 to 
2017 reduced Italian GDP by 4 points, among which 3.5 points were related to 
national consolidation and 0.5 point was due to the fiscal consolidation of trade part-
ners. In addition, austerity was self-defeating as it produced a rise in the ratio of public 
debt-to-GDP that dismantled the consolidation efforts made 10 years before. 
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Figure 3. Evolution
1995-2018
Public sector stat
Source: Eurostat.
1995 1999
1995 1999
18
19
20
16
17
18
19
20Italy's chronic low-growth problem and its drivers
It would however be incomplete to attribute low growth in Italy only to a badly-
timed austerity, one that in particular did not take into account the cyclical situation of 
the economy. Indeed, GDP growth in Italy has been significantly lower than in other 
countries for many years, notably before the Great Recession.
 As Table 2 reveals, average real GDP growth rates in Italy began to decelerate 
already in the 1980s (i.e. in correspondence with the explosion of the public debt, see 
supra). Nevertheless, in those days, average growth rates were still comparable to 
Germany's and France's. The growth trajectories of Italy and its neighbors instead 
became divergent in the 2000s. Italy's average real growth has indeed been below 1% 
since 2000 and far below Germany's and France's.
Another signal about the Italian growth decline can be grasped by looking at the 
evolution of productivity, which is a simple indicator of a country's structural perfor-
mance, one that in particular captures the efficiency by which inputs are used to 
generate output. Figure 4 reveals how Italian total factor productivity (TFP) experienced 
 of government expenditure components and total tax revenues in relation to nominal GDP, 
istics
Table 2. Average real GDP annual growth rates
In % 
1960-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2014
Germany 3.692 3.177 1.807 2.894 1.493 2.604
France 4.992 4.000 1.141 2.364 1.461 1.952
Italy 4.814 5.063 1.810 2.496 0.881 0.642
Source: University of Groeningen Penn World Table dataset.
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Publications occasionnelles (121).a cumulative decline of 7.9% over the latest 20 years.4 This contrasts with the efficiency 
gains experienced by France and Germany, where productivity increased by 4.1% and 
7.9% respectively. 
The Italian decline can be related to the country's specific structural factors 
hindering its growth potential. Some of them, like the dualism between the North and 
the South, have plagued the country almost since its foundation. Others, like the small 
size of firms and the excessive specialization in low tech sectors play a key role in 
explaining the weak export dynamics. We discuss each of these factors in more detail 
below.
Specialization bias towards low-tech sectors 
Italian industrial specialization has historically been concentrated in low-tech 
sectors wherein the competition of low-wage countries, such as China, became 
particularly stronger in the 2000's. A study by Bugamelli et al. (2012) shows that the 
Italian industrial structure is indeed unbalanced towards traditional and low-value-
added sectors. These sectors also have little technological content as well as a low 
demand for innovative technologies. This limits the extent to which newly created 
knowledge can be applied, e.g. through downstream and upstream linkages, to other 
high-value-added uses (renewable energy machineries, robotics, bio- and nano-tech-
nologies, …). For instance, the broad textile sector (including clothing, leather and 
shoe sectors) accounts for around 14% of total manufacturing value-added in Italy 
whereas it only accounts for 5% in France and 3% in Germany. On the contrary, the 
sectors more prone to innovate (e.g. ICT, radio-television machineries, chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals) account for around 16% of manufacturing value-added in Italy, 
while they represent 20% and 21% in France and Germany respectively.
The “nanism” of Italian firms 
Italian firms are too small on average to compete in international markets and to 
trigger a virtuous circle of productivity and employment growth. The small-size bias of 
Italian manufacturing companies compared to EU competitors is well-illustrated by 
Figure 4. Dynamique de la productivité globale des facteurs (PGF)
1996 = 1
Source : EU-KLEMS.
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39(4): 1043-1067.Figure 5, reproduced from a recent work by Berlingieri et al. (2018). What clearly 
emerges is that the share of micro-firms (below 9 employees) is much larger in Italy 
than in other European countries (bottom panel). In addition, small and medium 
Italian firms are much less productive than their European counterparts (top panel). 
The productivity gap disappears only for large enterprises. The net effect on aggregate 
productivity depends therefore upon the relative balance between small and large 
firms. Since the medium and large firms in Italy represent less than 3% of all the popu-
lation and the micro and small firms account for around 90% of the whole population, 
the aggregate effect is a lower productivity with respect to the EU partners.  
Three possible explanations may account for the “nanism” of Italian firms and their 
low productivity. First, “historical accidents” played a key role. One example is the 
dismantlement of the oligopolistic core in the 1990s, also as a consequence of privati-
zation programs (see Dosi & Guarascio, 2016). Another one is the historically 
persistent specialization in small-scale artisanal productions (see De Cecco, 2012). 
Second, a recent empirical work by Dosi et al. (2012) suggests the co-existence of a 
group of dynamic firms with a generally bigger ensemble of much less technologically 
advanced and small firms. The latter firms nonetheless survive quite comfortably, due 
to the exploitation of local markets niches. However, the small size of these niches is 
unlikely to trigger significant firm learning and technological spillovers, thus ampli-
fying the technological gap of Italian manufacturing with respect to other European 
countries. Finally, a third important explanation is credit constraints, which are on 
average stronger for small firms, therefore limiting their growth possibilities.  
Figure 5. Firm size and productivity in the manufacturing sector, Italy and EU average
Source: Authors' elaboration from Berlingeri et al. (2019).
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Percentage of firms by size class (average over the 2000-2012 period)
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Italy is characterized by a chronic problem of misallocation and underutilization of 
talents. This is evident from several well-known indicators, revealing extremely high 
levels of corruption, incidence of tax evasion and of shadow economy compared to 
similar countries in Europe. Distortions in the allocation of opportunities are exempli-
fied by the high social immobility in Italy compared to other EU countries. This high 
social immobility is mainly explained by non-meritocratic channels such as nepotism, 
political patronage and family labor market networks (Raitano & Vona, 2015). The 
resulting perception of injustice has led a large number of Italian graduates to migrate 
in other countries where non-meritocratic mechanisms are weaker. Moreover, the prev-
alence of these channels in the Italian labor market undermines the incentives to invest 
in human capital, therefore creating a persistent under-supply of skills needed to 
increase specialization in high-tech sectors. 
The North vs. South divide  
The above-mentioned factors hindering Italy's growth potential are stronger in 
Southern regions than in Northern ones. In addition, the North vs. South divide, which 
has characterized the country almost since its foundation has become more 
pronounced in the aftermath of the Great Recession. Figure 6 gives an idea of the 
increased North-South divergence in response to the crisis. In the 1995-2016 period, 
the value-added per worker (a proxy for labor productivity) in manufacturing fell by 
more than 20% in the South, and only by 11% in the North. This result is even more 
striking if one considers that the initial level of productivity was already approximately 
three times higher in the North (15 802 euros in 1995) than in the South (5 499 euros 
in 1995). Investments per worker after 2008 have also much more collapsed in the 
South than in the North. And with respect to the 1995 levels, the overall effect has 
been a 16% increase in the North and a zero gain in the South.5 Not surprisingly, the 
differential resilience to the crisis of Northern and Southern regions mapped into a 
wider and persistent gap in several labor market outcomes. For instance, the North-
South gap in unemployment rates increased by 25% after the Great Recession. Such a 
gap is even larger among those younger than 24 years. Finally, we also observe a 
substantial worsening of the historical North-South gap in the incidence of irregular 
labor and in labor force participation (see Antonin et al., 2019).
The ISTAT data also documents an increase in the North-South real wage gap (a 
30% increase in the North, and a 5% decline in the South over 1995-2016). However, 
the comparison of real wage levels using a national deflator might be misleading as 
living costs are significantly different across Italian regions. A recent work by Boeri et al.
(2019) corrects for this bias and shows that real wages are lower in the North than in 
the South. This would indicate the absence of relationship between wages and produc-
tivity (high in the North and lower in the South), that can be related to the centralized 
system of collective bargaining and the lack of diffusion of the two-tier wage negotia-
tion system, mostly occurring at the local and firm levels. Boeri et al. (2019) show that 
a decentralization of the bargaining system similar to the German one would instead 
give a big boost to investment and employment in the South.
However, such a result rests on the strong assumption that real wages are at the 
market clearing level in the North. As a result, this proposal is tantamount to cutting 
wages in the South. Such a cut, combined with the tight constraints already existing 
on Italy's fiscal policy, could exacerbate the effects on growth and public debt of 
adverse macroeconomic shocks (like the one of the Great Recession discussed above). 
More generally, it is difficult to believe that wage cuts would be enough to incentivize 
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Figure 6. Per capita value added
Source: ISTAT regional accounts.
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Northinvestment in the South of Italy, whose economy seem to be stuck in a low-employ-
ment, low-productivity trap, mostly due to the strong incidence of factors like the 
talents' misallocation discussed above and to the complete absence of complementary 
production factors that makes investment worth (e.g. physical and infrastructural 
capital, technical skills and firm capabilities).  
Policy recommendations to reignite economic growth  
in Italy  
Escaping the high-debt low-growth trap is no easy task. The variety and the persis-
tence of factors which are responsible for the Italian decline make it difficult to believe 
in recipes that address only some aspects of the problem. The recent political economy 
debate in Italy is characterized by a sharp division between two factions: those who 
attribute the causes of Italian economic decline to the straitjackets imposed by the 
European fiscal rules and by the common monetary policy, and those instead who 
stress the positive aspects of fiscal consolidations and point to the excessive rigidities of 
labor and product markets as the main cause of the country's low growth. 
Such a polarized debate is not very fruitful. Indeed, this polarization originates from 
considering demand and structural factors as completely separated, which is, in our 
view, misleading. It is clear that Italy's low growth problem began much before the 
introduction of the common currency. At the same time, it is clear that some of the 
problems, like the regional dualism, are too profound to be solved solely by reforms 
targeting rigidities. They require instead active industrial policies with the essential 
support of government-sponsored investments (in education, research and innova-
tion, infrastructures, etc.). In addition, one should not undermine the role that a badly-
timed and self-defeating austerity played in exacerbating the impact of the Great 
Recession on Italy's growth, regional disparities, and public debt. 
The chicken-egg problem is that, on the one hand, austerity prevents the use of 
fiscal levers to tackle some structural problems of the country. On the other hand, 
disregarding the role of structural problems may undermine the effectiveness of 
 in the manufacturing sector, per macro-region
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(3 septembre).expansionary fiscal policies and of public investments in particular. It follows that an 
approach (see also Dosi et al., 2017, and Amendola & Gaffard, 2019) considering 
interactions between demand and structural (i.e. supply-driven) factors would be more 
useful in addressing the Italian low growth problem and, relatedly, its high debt one. 
The policy recommendations that follow are inspired by this approach.
Associate public investments to industrial policy and notably mission-oriented  
public programs
A standard critique towards additional public expenditure programs, like those that 
stem from the modified golden rule described below, is that they will ultimately end 
up in a waste of resources, especially in Italy, characterized by high levels of corruption 
in some areas. A similar critique is that those investment programs, like the generous 
fiscal expansions of the 1970s, would not result in an increase in long-term growth. To 
address these critiques, public investment should be associated to industrial policies
targeting the structural problems exposed in the previous section. These industrial 
policies should aim at nurturing knowledge accumulation and developing capabilities 
in certain sectors (see Cimoli et al. 2009). They could also be implemented via mission-
oriented programs targeting specific objectives, and should be supported by a long-
term financial commitment from the public sector (see Mazzucato, 2018). An example 
is the green transition that had large multiplier effects at the local level in the United 
States (see Vona et al., 2019).
Clearly, to be effective, the above mentioned industrial policies must also be 
combined with a substantial improvement of the quality of Italian public administra-
tion. This is to ensure that the funds mobilized by such policies are not captured by 
rent-seekers, criminal firms and politically-connected incumbents. This is particularly 
relevant for industrial policies aimed at tackling the Italian dualism, whereby Southern 
companies are usually infiltrated by criminal organizations (the recent scandal of wind 
farms is an example). The creation of special development zones, initially isolated by 
the influence of local actors and with special fiscal and regulatory status, could be a 
solution to trigger a change in Southern regions and create a critical mass of dynamic 
entrepreneurs and capabilities.   
Remove public investments from the computation of the structural primary 
balance that is relevant for the excessive deficit procedure
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) should be modified to exclude some specific 
forms of government investment expenditures from the computation of the excessive 
deficit procedure, while current expenditure should be balanced over the course of the 
business cycle (see Dervis & Saraceno, 2014). This modified Golden Rule, which is inter-
temporally fairer than current fiscal rules in the SGP, would allow a high debt country 
like Italy to use certain types of investments both as a cyclical lever to compensate the 
fall of aggregate demand during a recession, and as a long-term instrument to address 
the country's structural problems. Fiscal discipline would be enforced as current 
expenditures should remain balanced. 
Besides the above golden rule, additional resources for investments could stem 
from savings on unproductive current expenditures (e.g. Cottarelli's spending review). 
These savings should amount to 34 billion euros in total, and could already free signifi-
cant resources for investment as they would correspond to 1% of Italy's nominal GDP 
and to 10% of the country's current total expenditure for gross fixed capital formation.
1
2
12   |   OFCE  policy brief
6.
ECB supervision should also be im-
proved by taking into consideration 
the high interconnectedness of to-
day's financial and banking sectors, 
see Napoletano M. & Battiston S., 
(2014). “Some reflections on the 
ECB's Comprehensive Assessment.” 
OFCE Le Blog. December 9th.Introduce minimum wage and reinforce retraining policies
As of 2019, 22 out of the 28 EU countries have an official minimum wage; Italy does 
not. This self-exclusion of Italy from the EU standard practice, is partly justified by the 
fact that the Italian labor market is already characterized by a collective “tripartite” 
wage bargaining at the industry level between workers' unions and firms' confedera-
tions, with the government playing the referee between the two parties. Since the 
collective agreement is automatically extended to everybody, this should in principle 
guarantee an outcome close to a minimum wage. However, the tripartite bargaining 
sign has shown some weaknesses over the last years, with a substantial increase of non-
compliance rates and the emergence of contracts signed by unions with little 
representation in the firms. The most vulnerable (i.e. unskilled) workers are the most 
penalized by the proliferation of these “atypical” labor market contracts.
Introducing a national, statutory minimum wage, determined by using the same 
tripartite fashion as collective agreements, is a way to solve these problems. Sector- 
and firm-level bargaining should be anchored to the minimum wage, which would 
then constitute a lower bound to all other agreements and all types of contracts. In 
addition, a minimum wage would sustain aggregate demand through higher wages to 
workers who are likely to be more credit constrained and thus with a higher marginal 
propensity to consume. 
Finally, to be effective, the minimum wage should be combined with a convincing 
and well-enforced sanction mechanisms for non-compliance, and by giving an active 
monitoring role to unions. In addition, it should be complemented by effective 
retraining programs for displaced and unemployed workers. The design of training 
interventions should also be radically rethought, by reallocating funds to centers with 
better capabilities to provide good quality training such as technical schools and 
universities.
Completing the banking union and solving the issue of non-performing loans (NPLs)
The nanism of Italian firms can be related to financial constraints, which are particu-
larly tight for Italian firms. This is also the result of the fragility of the Italian banking 
system, which stems two main factors. First, a significant Italian government bond 
share (20%) is held by domestic banks, which implies a high interdependence 
between the domestic financial system and public debt, with possible negative effects 
on credit supply and on real economy in case of rising bond yields. Second, non-
performing loans (NPLs) represent an important share of banking assets. According to 
the Bank of Italy, their gross total amount represented 189 billion euros in 2018 
(10,8% of GDP). A high proportion of NPLs erodes banks' net worth, it increases the 
risk of a bank's default, and it has negative effects on credit supply to firms as well. 
In order to improve the Italian banks' robustness and resilience to shock, we defend 
the idea that completing the banking union should remain on top of the agenda. Two 
out of the three main pillars of the banking union are already effective, namely the ECB 
supervision of systemically important financial institutions6 and the orderly resolution 
of failing banks. Yet, the third pillar, i.e. the European deposit insurance scheme, is still 
far from implementation; some countries argue that the risk of bank default is still too 
heterogeneous in the euro area to allow deposit guarantees to be pooled. Hence, 
solving the issue of NPLs appears like an important step towards completing the 
banking Union.
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Dani Rodrik's weblog 27.For the time being only country-level initiatives have been implemented, for 
instance recapitalizations or securitization with state guarantees in Italy. The gross 
amount of NPLs has been cut by almost one half since then, from 360 billion euros in 
2015 to 189 billion euros in 2018, while 52,7% of the NPLs have been provisioned. 
Apart from these solutions, the European public authorities still have a key role to play. 
Their levers include the definition of the regulatory and institutional framework and an 
extended ECB supervision (see Antonin et al., 2018).
Italy needs more Europe not less Europe
To reignite growth and solve its public debt problem Italy needs more Europe not less 
Europe. First, abandoning the euro, with a consequent huge devaluation of the 
currency, would have disastrous consequences on Italy's interest rates and on the 
government debt burden, which is denominated in euros. Second, and more impor-
tantly, most policies reigniting Italy's growth require the active participation and 
cooperation of the European Union to be effective. For instance, the introduction of a 
golden rule of fiscal policy needs re-discussing the entire framework of fiscal rules in 
the EU. The EU could also be helpful in mobilizing additional funds for Italy, via a 
common investment plan for the area (e.g. a Juncker's plan substantially rethought 
with stronger participation of public actors). Third, even industrial policies nurturing 
learning and firm capabilities seem infeasible without the explicit cooperation of Euro-
pean authorities in light of the existing norms constraining support to national firms. 
The same industrial policies would probably be more effective if they were part of a 
global industrial policy agenda of the entire union, rather than being the exclusive 
focus of single countries. 
In conclusion, Italy cannot solve its economic problems without the help of Europe, 
but solving these problems requires an active role of Italy (which is a founding country 
of the union) in a process of overall reform of European policies. This process should 
ultimately converge towards a fully-fledged federal state in Europe, and in particular 
one with common fiscal policy and redistributive mechanisms across states. Indeed, a 
good deal of the conundrums Europe is experiencing, like those associated with migra-
tion, economic slackness and populistic pressures for disintegration, originate from the 
incompleteness of the European construction. In this respect, it can be helpful to adapt 
Dani Rodrik's famous trilemma to the European Union (see Rodrik, 2007). The trilemma 
states the impossibility of having at the same time globalization, democracy, and the 
nation state. In a situation where globalization, i.e. international economic integration, 
seems irreversible, preserving democracy requires abandoning sovereignty and moving 
towards a federal state. Europe's democracies are instead stuck in a limbo between the 
nation state and federalism, where the solution to single countries' problems (like Italy's 
low growth one) now require the active cooperation among states, but where such a 
cooperation is difficult or absent. Yet, for federalism not to be perceived as a mere tech-
nocratic idea, the European political project must be revived. This in particular requires 
deepening the democratic side of Europe and binding together countries with shared 
European values  ■
5
Directeur de la publication  Xavier Ragot
Rédacteur en chef du blog et des Policy b
Réalisation  Najette Moummi (OFCE).  
Copyright © 2019 – OFCE policy brief  ISSN
ISBN 979-10-90994-09-6
484 pages
Revue de l’
AMÉLIORE
CONSTRUCTION E
Contribu
Pierre A
CHALLE,
GROSSM
Yuemei 
Pierre M
Rémi OD
Philippe
SAUSSAY
GregoryAMÉLIORER LA CONSTRUCTION 
EUROPÉENNE
Présentation générale
PARTIE I
Convergences et divergences dans l’Union européenne
PARTIE II
Quelle politique monétaire européenne face à l'instabilité 
financière ?
PARTIE III
Quelle politique budgétaire en Europe ?
PARTIE IV
Fiscalité des entreprises en Europe
PARTIE V
L’Europe du bien-être et du climat
PARTIE VI
Démocratie et institutions en Europe
D
éc
em
b
re
 2
01
8
OFCE 15
8
R LA 
UROPÉENNE
Revue de l’OFCE n° 158
teurs
LDAMA, Guillaume ALLÈGRE, Céline ANTONIN, Christophe BLOT, Édouard 
 Jérôme CREEL, Paul DE GRAUWE, Bruno DUCOUDRÉ, Cyrielle GAGLIO, Emiliano 
AN, Mattia GUERINI, Sarah GUILLOU,   Éric HEYER, Paul HUBERT, Maria JEPSEN, 
JI, Gissela LANDA RIVERA, Éloi LAURENT, Enrico LETTA, Sandrine LEVASSEUR, 
ADEC, Paul MALLIET, Marcello MESSORI, Mauro NAPOLETANO, Lionel NESTA, 
RY, Maxime PARODI, Julien PELLEFIGUE, Hélène PÉRIVIER, Mathieu PLANE, 
 POCHET, Xavier RAGOT, Frédéric REYNÈS, Raul SAMPOGNARO, Aurélien 
, Francesco SARACENO, Henri STERDYNIAK, Xavier TIMBEAU, Vincent TOUZÉ, 
 VERDUGO, Nicolas VÉRON, Sébastien VILLEMOT.riefs  Guillaume Allègre
 2271-359X. All Rights Reserved.
www.ofce.sciences-po.fr    @ofceparis
Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques  l  Centre de recherche en économie de Sciences Po
10, place de Catalogne   l   75014 Paris    l   Tél/ 01 44 18 54 00 
To reference this document: 
Céline Antonin, Mattia Guerini, Mauro Napoletano, Francesco Vona, 2019 “Italy: Escaping the high-debt 
and low-growth trap.”  OFCE Policy brief  56, may 14.
